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I. INTRODUCTION
In the twenty-first century, the era of globalization, global norms are
shifting from the sovereign state as actor to supranational bodies that are
peripheral to the nation-state.1 Within this shifting paradigm the field of
international law has both led and followed, through the emergence of a
multitude of international dispute settlement bodies which have adopted
existing norms and will undoubtedly shape future norms. 2 While still
considered "alternative" in many domestic legal systems, Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) has become the standard approach to solving many
international disputes. 3 Outside of the traditional court system, bodies and
institutions have arisen around the world at varying levels (from individual to
corporate to state actor) in which the relevant actors have voluntarily
J.D. (expected 2014), The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, Hon. Pol.
Sci., University of Cape Town, B. Soc. Sci. (Pol., Phi. & Econ.), University of Cape
Town. My thanks go to Prof. Daniel C.K. Chow and Prof. John Quigley, both at The
Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, for their advice and support both inside
and outside the classroom.
I See generally Robert 0. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54 INT'L ORG. 457 (2000).
2 Id. at 457 n. 1. See also David A. Lake, Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review,
INT'L ORG. 219 (2009) ("[P]olitics is the dependent variable and how the actor is situated
in the international economy is the independent variable. In reality, of course, these two
sets of questions are themselves integrated.").
3 See generally Keohane et al., supra note 1. For a list of international dispute
resolution mechanisms see International Dispute Settlement, ELECTRONIC INFO. SYS. FOR
INT'L L., http://www.eisil.org/index.php?sid =842972992&t-subjpages&cat-788 (last
visited May 21, 2014). See also DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 613 (2d
ed. 2010) ("[I]n international business ... [a]lternative methods of dispute settlement ...
are more frequently employed rather than the courts.").
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submitted themselves to nondomestic, extrajudicial procedures in order to
resolve their disputes.4
This emphasis on ADR techniques and practices is no longer a
phenomenon but has become the norm.5 As regional agreements and treaties
have bound certain states to particular dispute resolution mechanisms, so
countries have voluntarily acceded to extraneous jurisdiction; indeed, as the
wave of globalization has barreled its way around the world, so more and
more nations have recognized the necessity of yielding such authority in
order to achieve effective dispute resolution.6 As early as 1999 there were
"seventeen permanent, independent international courts .. . [twenty-three]
quasi-judicial tribunals, panels, and commissions charged with similar
functions . .. [and nearly sixty] bodies negotiated but not yet in operation."7
This number is constantly increasing to the point where the amount of
permanent international arbitration, mediation, and dispute settlement
mechanisms has become innumerable, and ad hoc tribunals of some form or
other have experienced equally significant growth.8
Yet in the African continent this trend has been notable by its absence.
This paper will argue that African nations are "behind the times" in their
inability to commit to regional dispute settlement mechanisms. In the arena
of trade and commerce a vacuum exists in the African continent which, if
filled, may have a substantial impact in terms of African economic cohesion
and cooperation, as well as attracting trade and investment from foreign
parties. Regardless of the economics, other benefits may accrue to African
4 Keohane et al., supra note 1, at 457 ("States . . . control access to dispute
resolution tribunals or courts"); CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3 ("[T]hese
alternative methods must be chosen by agreement of the parties").
5 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3; Keohane et al., supra note 1, at 457 n.1.
6 Keohane et al., supra note 1, at 457 n.1; see also generally David Held, The
Changing Structure of International Law: Sovereignty Transformed?, in THE GLOBAL
TRANSFORMATIONS READER 162 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2d ed. 2003).
7 Keohane et al., supra note 1, at 457 n.1.
8 International Dispute Settlement, supra note 3. Cf August Reinisch, The
Proliferation of International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: The Threat of
Fragmentation vs. the Promise of a More Effective System? Some Reflections From the
Perspective of Investment Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM
AND FRAGMENTATION - FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF GERHARD HAFNER 107 (Isabelle
Buffard, James Crawford, Alain Pellet, I. Buffard & Stephan Wittich eds. 2008) ("For
more than a decade, international lawyers and international relations scholars have been
fascinated by an ever-increasing number of international courts and tribunals.").
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nations in the arenas of interstate conflict, electoral disputes, and governance
concerns.
This paper will assess the normative approach to international dispute
settlement provided by alternative transnational and supranational dispute
resolution mechanisms, as well as briefly (and more descriptively) survey
such existing mechanisms. Section II will describe the modern norms of
incorporating ADR processes into transnational dispute resolution. Section
III will assess existing international mechanisms for dispute resolution.
Section IV will descriptively analyze African efforts and interests in
establishing dispute resolution mechanisms. This analysis will focus on the
stated goals of the New Economic Partnership for African Development
(NEPAD) and the African Union (AU), and their subsequent efforts to
achieve these goals. Indeed, subsequent normative analysis must be made of
the pros and cons of such dispute resolution mechanisms in the African
context, and as such the legitimacy of NEPAD and the AU will form a
significant talking point. Having described the problem itself, Section IV will
conclude with a number of arguments in favor of a new African transnational
dispute resolution body that incorporates ADR themes into its processes.
Finally, Section V will describe the basic means of implementing such
dispute resolution mechanisms.
II. THE ROLE OF ADR MECHANISMS
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is a field of study and practice that
seeks to resolve disputes between entities without resorting to traditional
court-based litigation.9 ADR is continually evolving and growing, typically
(if not exclusively) involving one or a combination of three primary
mechanisms of dispute resolution: negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.' 0
A rapidly emerging if not firmly established avenue of dispute settlement for
individuals in the domestic setting, ADR mechanisms have come to dominate
the international arena.1" Indeed, even outside of the international arena,
"there is now increasing recognition of the fact that every type of dispute can
9 Karl J. Mackie, Dispute Resolution: The New Wave, in A HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION (Karl J. Mackie ed., 1999). Entities can include individuals, corporations, or
states, to name but a few possibilities.
10 ALBERT FIADJOE, ALTERNATIVE DIsPUTE RESOLUTION: A DEVELOPING WORLD
PERSPECTIVE 1 (2004).
11 See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
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be the subject of a dispute resolution process ... [and] ADR is becoming the
preferred choice for the resolution of conflict and disagreement."l 2
ADR can at times provide a far superior mode of dispute resolution to
traditional litigation, as it is based on a philosophy of "co-operative problem-
solving"-indeed it is typically tailored to the needs of the parties, by the
parties themselves.13 The reasons for this include ADR's capacity to impact
people's "standards of behaviour"; to both rely on and entrench
"interpersonal and community ties that are ... meaningful to parties"; to look
towards resolving ongoing conflict and prevent future antagonism; and the
idea that ADR can "create and maintain mutual respect, commitment, civility
and creativity."' 4
Indeed, these plaudits ring particularly true at the international level,
where ADR dominates the field of international dispute resolution.' 5 While
there remains some (albeit little) debate as to the true value that ADR
processes offer at the domestic, individual level (as compared to the litigation
process), there is little doubt that ADR is the more attractive option for
nations to pursue in settling their differences.16 This is due to a number of
reasons: (1) nation-states' reluctance to put their fate in the hands of "third
parties"; (2) the fact that adjudicatory procedures (and certainly litigious
procedures) are zero-sum (one party wins, the other loses); (3) the realization
by nation-state actors that a litigious or adjudicative procedure is unlikely to
resolve the underlying nature of the dispute; (4) wariness of litigation due to
its susceptibility to be used as a negotiation or diplomatic "tactic"; and (5)
nation-states' general lack of interest in establishing international law (or
precedent).' 7 It is worth mentioning, too, that legal action against nation-
states may run into difficulty on certain issues due to the notion of foreign
12 FIADJOE, supra note 10, at 1.
13 Tony F. Marshall, Neighbour Disputes: Community Mediation Schemes as an
Alternative to Litigation, in A HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 9, at 65,
66-67.
I4 Id at 67.
15 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3; MARTIN DIXON, INTERNATIONAL LAW 280-
81 (2007).
16 See generally Richard B. Bilder, Some Limitations of Adjudication as an
International Dispute Settlement Technique, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 3 (1982). For a discussion
of the merits of litigation versus ADR processes, see Edward Brunet, Questioning the
Quality ofAlternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REv. 1 (1987).
17 Bilder, supra note 16, at 3-5.
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sovereign immunity.' 8 This can make legal action against states very difficult
through the traditional, national court litigation system. 19 ADR is thus
extremely attractive to nation-states in their various approaches to resolving
conflict and disputes amongst and between one another.
III. INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS
A number of international dispute mechanisms exist, which provide an
indication of existing norms with regards to, as well as extent of emphasis
placed on, dispute resolution mechanisms in the international arena during
the era of globalization. 20 A brief background is necessary to understand
these institutional mechanisms' role and location in the international
landscape, as well as the emphasis that is currently placed on ADR in
international dispute resolution. This section will thereafter survey a number
of these institutional mechanisms and examine their roles more precisely, as
well as explore their varying proclivities towards ADR.
A. Background
As noted above, international dispute resolution mechanisms dot the
landscape of international law in multiple arenas. 21 The fundamental aim of
such mechanisms is always to resolve disputes; a dispute between nations
(i.e. an international dispute) is described under one definition as a
"disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of
interests between two states . . . [and] relate[s] to an alleged breach of one or
more legal duties." 22 An alternative definition is that "an international
dispute can be said to exist whenever ... a disagreement involves
governments, institutions, juristic person (corporation) or private individuals
in different parts of the world." 23
18 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 323 (2008) ("[M]any
national courts will refuse to exercise jurisdiction in cases involving foreign acts of
state.").
19 For a detailed discussion of this issue, see id. at 323-48.
20 See supra notes 1-8.
21 DIXON, supra note 15.
22 Ian Brownlie, The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, 8 CHINESE J.
INT'L L. 267, 268 (2009).
23 J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1 (2011).
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Various processes can be used to resolve these disputes. Negotiation is
typically the starting point, and is usually conducted directly by the parties,
occasionally with reference to certain legal or political criteria. 24
Mediation,25 conciliation, 26 ombudsmen,27 and commissions of inquiry28 are
other forms of ADR that are commonly used to resolve international
disputes. 29 After negotiation, the largest form of ADR in the international
24 See id.; see also Brownlie, supra note 22, at 270; Richard Bilder, An Overview of
International Dispute Settlement, 1 EMORY J. INT'L DIS. RES. 1, 22 (1986) ("Negotiation
is a process whereby the parties directly communicate and bargain with each other in an
attempt to agree on a settlement of the issue. By choosing to use this technique, the
parties retain maximum control of the process and outcome. Negotiation is clearly the
predominant, usual and preferred method of resolving international disputes.").
25 Mediation involves a third party "facilitating communication" between parties,
and typically assisting in the negotiations. Bilder, supra note 24, at 24 ("[T]he mediator
usually plays a[n] . . . active part in facilitating communications and negotiations between
the parties, and is sometimes permitted or expected to advance informal and nonbinding
proposals of his or her own.") In certain contexts, particularly mediations conducted by
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a technique akin to mediation, known as
"good offices," may be used. Bilder, id. ("Good offices and mediation are techniques in
which the parties, unable to resolve a dispute by negotiation, request or agree to limited
intervention by a third party to help them break the impasse.).
26 Conciliation is similar to mediation, although typically conciliation will involve a
heightened emphasis on fact-finding. DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 106-07
(Douglas H. Yam ed., 1999) ("[C]onciliation has two basic functions: to investigate and
clarify the facts in dispute, and to attempt to bring the parties into agreement by
suggesting mutually acceptable solutions to the problem.").
27 Ombudsmen can play different roles, but they are typically intended to "deal[]
with complains from the public regarding decisions, actions, or omissions of public
administration." About the 101, INT'L OMBUDSMAN INST., http://www.theioi.org/the-i-o-
i/about-the-ioi (last visited May 25, 2014) ("The role of the ombudsman is to protect the
people against violation of rights, abuse of powers, error, negligence, unfair decisions and
maladministration and to improve public administration while making the government's
actions more open and its administration more accountable to the public."). Ombudsmen
can also be employed by entities such as governments and private corporations in order to
resolve a large number of disputes swiftly and efficiently, such as Kenneth Feinberg in
the BP Oil Spill and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. See, for e.g., Terry Carter, The Master of
Disasters: Is it Just Him, or is Kenneth Feinberg Changing the Court of Mass Tort
Resolution?, 97 A.B.A. J. 33 (2011). The use of ombudsmen need not be limited to
domestic disputes, but can be extended to settlement of international disputes.
28 Commissions of inquiry are focused on fact-finding rather than rules of law, in
order to contribute to the settlement of certain disputes. See generally S.M.G. KOOPMANS,
DIPLOMATIC DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1-3 (2008).
29 Brownlie, supra note 22, at 271-72; MERRILLS, supra note 23, at 26-79.
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sphere is undoubtedly arbitration, which is akin to litigation in that arbitrators
do cast binding judgments on the parties. 30 However, arbitration differs
tremendously in that the parties have the opportunity to dictate the terms of
the arbitral process, even to the point of selecting their arbitrator/adjudicator
themselves. 31 Indeed, arbitration is extremely popular in international dispute
resolution and "provides a major element in the pattern of methods of
peaceful settlement." 32 Furthermore, the New York Convention 33 has
ensured that arbitral awards are not only enforceable in all countries that are
signatories to the Convention, but that "enforcing a foreign arbitration award
is much easier than forcing a foreign judgment." 34
B. The Role ofInternational Agreements and Organizations
Outside of the general processes of arbitration, mediation, and
negotiation, there are a number of institutionalized dispute resolution
mechanisms that function in international law. The International Court of
Justice (ICJ) is a more judicially-based mechanism run under the auspices of
the United Nations; however, it also incorporates elements of ADR in its
approach. 35 For instance, "[s]tates not bound by the system of compulsory
jurisdiction may agree to resort to the Court [and] ... the Court has a
jurisdiction of an advisory character." 36 In one sense, the ICJ is not judicial at
all, since the powers of the ICJ can be extremely limited by national courts'
unwillingness to effectuate judgments of the ICJ.37 In this sense, the ICJ's
30 See MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL DIsPuTE RESOLUTION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 105-07 (2d ed. 2012).
31 See Alan S. Rau & Edward F. Sherman, Tradition and Innovation in International
Arbitration Procedure, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 89 (1995).
32 Brownlie, supra note 22, at 277; see also CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at
619.
33 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Jun.
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
34 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at 644.
35 Brownlie, supra note 22, at 277-81; see also MERRILLS, supra note 23, at 116-41.
36 Brownlie, supra note 22, at 277; see also MERRILLS, supra note 23, at 142-161.
37 See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). U.N. Charter Article 94
requires that signatory member-nations shall "undertake to comply" with ICJ decisions.
U.N. Charter art. 94. The U.S. Supreme Court found this language to indicate a non-self-
executing treaty, since Article 94 "does not provide that the United States 'shall' or
'must' comply with an ICJ decision." Medellin, 552 U.S. at 508. In short, the ICJ's
339
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
capacity to effectively resolve disputes involving nation-states as parties is
tenuous at best. Thus, even when international dispute mechanisms are
structured as juridical court-based systems, liberties are taken that
demonstrate a tendency towards ADR methods and approaches.
An exception to this rule is the International Criminal Court (ICC). The
ICC embodies a particularly trial-based approach. 38 Of especial interest to
the African continent is the fact that the Rome Statute establishing the ICC
was the first written normative instrument potentially of a universal character
which qualifies serious violations of humanitarian law in internal conflicts as
war crimes, and the first that provides a mechanism for their prosecution at
the intemational level. 39 This would have a tremendous impact for a number
of African states over the first decade of the twenty-first century. 40 Just as the
ICC was born out of the Rome Statute-an international agreement-so do
many international dispute settlement mechanisms in the realm of trade and
commerce exist as a function of an international agreement. For instance the
International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) 41 resulted in the
creation of the World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID). 42 ICSID provides for independent arbitration
of international investment disputes, and compulsory resort to ICSID may be
provided for in individual Bilateral Investment Treaties.43 The World Trade
decisions should be viewed by U.S. courts as non-binding guidelines-the U.S. Congress
has the option to create legislation effectuating the ICJ decisions.
38 WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 206-342 (4th ed. 2011).
39 Luigi Coridorelli, War Crimes and Internal Conflicts in the Statute of the
International Criminal Court, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY 107, 112 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001).
40 See Olympia Bekou & Sangeeta Shah, Realising the Potential of the International
Criminal Court: The African Experience, 6 HuM. RTs L. REv. 499,499 (2006) ("[E]fforts
of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to eradicate impunity for international crimes
have been focused in the African region . . . [and] despite their willingness to make use of
the ICC system for prosecutions, African States . . . have made very little progress in
implementing the Rome Statute.").
41 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S.
No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966), reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 532
(1965).
4 2 Lucy REED, JAN PAULSSON & NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 1
(2004).
43 Id. at 41.
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Organization (WTO) also maintains a fulltime Dispute Settlement
Mechanism (DSM) designed to hear complaints between signatory member
states.44 Indeed, "an agreement that specified a set of rules constraining the
conduct of its signatories would be expected to have, as in any rule-based
system, a mechanism of enforcement of the rules and a means for settlement
of disputes about alleged violation of rules." 45
Similarly to the WTO DSM, many other trade agreements also provide
for some form of formal dispute resolution mechanism, based on the same
logic as espoused above. 46 It is indeed this logic that drives the creation of
any international dispute settlement mechanism and in Africa these
mechanisms are apparent by their very absence.
IV. DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS IN AFRICA
This section will describe in some detail the existing mechanisms within
Africa that fulfill a transnational dispute resolution role. The status quo is far
from encouraging, but there are signs of light, primarily in the form of certain
regional bodies that have created dispute resolution mechanisms in the
absence of a continental mechanism. The section thus opens by examining
these existing mechanisms, with special emphasis on the African Union's
(failed) efforts to create a continental mechanism. Thereafter, the section will
discuss the background and intended role of such mechanisms in the African
context. Special mention must be made of the African integrationist project,
and the relative failure of African nations to achieve their goals in this
regard. This is most illuminating in light of their inability to create an
effective medium for resolution of disputes. Finally, the section will examine
the various arguments in favor of the establishment of such a dispute
resolution body. The most prominent of these arguments is that the
integrationist project requires some kind of enforcement device or body for
the settlement of disputes in order to engender a sense of legitimacy in an
otherwise toothless institution and project. Additionally, the very laudable
4 See generally T. N. Srinivasan, The Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO: A
Brief History and an Evaluation from Economic, Contractarian and Legal Perspectives,
30 WORLD ECON. 1033 (2007).
45 Id. at 1033-34 (emphasis added).
46 See, e.g., Ljiljana Biukovic, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms and Regional Trade
Agreements: South American and Caribbean Modalities, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. AND
POLICY 255 (2008) (looking at dispute resolution mechanisms in the Central American
Common Market, the Andean Community, the Caribbean Community and Common
Market, and the Southern Common Market).
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aims of the International Criminal Court must be measured against its
apparent loss of legitimacy within Africa. In the absence of African nations'
support for the Court, there is no body responsible for dispensing
international criminal justice within the African continent, at least no body
that is endorsed by both African leaders and their governments, as well as the
people of Africa themselves. This presents a strong reason for African
nations to take upon themselves the role of dispensing justice, while doing it
in a manner conducive to the peaceful resolution of disputes-thus taking
into account African political realities. Thirdly, the failure of existing
mechanisms will be examined in two parts: firstly, that such mechanisms
have been created in the past is testament to a legitimate desire and need for
such mechanisms; and secondly, that these bodies have failed in their aims
demonstrates that a new approach is required.
A. The Status Quo
As distinguished above in Section III, dispute resolution mechanisms can
exist on two different dimensions: the domestic (or local) level, and the
international level. This paper is primarily focused on the international level;
however, it is interesting to note that alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms have existed in African traditional societies for generations. 47
Where national governments have implemented domestic ADR procedures,
such procedures have been largely successful. 48 This success is attributed
partly to ADR's ability to "bridge the gap between the formal legal system
and traditional modes of African justice."49 Those describing ADR's success
in Africa note its potential for "stabilization and statebuilding," and there are
persistent calls for increased application of ADR in African society.50 This
should indicate the potential for ADR to play a larger role in facilitating
successful and efficient settlement of disputes in the African context.
In this respect, however, dispute settlement mechanisms are in fact
notable by their absence. In the field of security, in 1996, southern African
47 Ernest E. Uwazie, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Africa: Preventing Conflict
and Enhancing Stability, 16 AFR. SEC. BRIEF 1, 3 (November 2011), available at
http://www.csus.edu/hhs/pdfs/AfricaBriefFinal_16.pdf; see also FIADJOE, supra note 10,
at 2, 4-5 ("Societies in Africa . . . were practicing non-litigious means of dispute
resolution long before the advent of the nation state.").
48 Uwazie, supra note 47, at 4-5.
49 Id. at 4.
50 Id. at 4-5.
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countries created the "little-known" Association of Southern African States
(ASAS) which was intended to ensure the security of its member states. 51
However, to this day, "ASAS has yet to create the appropriate organs for
dealing formally with conflicts in the region." 52 This is a trend that has been
followed widely: the creation of supranational organizations with heady
goals that unfortunately fail to implement a suitable supranational dispute
settlement mechanism. For instance, the Southern African Customs Union
Agreement provides for "policies and instruments to address unfair trade
practices between Member States." 53 Yet, such "policies and instruments
have not been finalized and [disputes] still need to be addressed on an ad hoc
basis." 54 Furthermore, and perhaps even more maddeningly, while the treaty
did ostensibly provide for the creation of an ad hoc tribunal that would have
jurisdiction not only "over trade disputes between States, but also disputes
relating to other inter-State matters as well as disputes between natural or
legal persons and States," no such tribunal has ever materialized, and "all
disputes have been resolved bilaterally."55
There are exceptions to this rule, such as the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) Conflict Prevention Framework, which in
its very wording appears to embody the heart and soul of dispute
resolution. 56 The Framework explains that "conflict is the motor of
transformation and is either positive or negative. It can be creatively
transformed to ensure equity, progress and harmony; or destructively
transformed to engender acute insecurity."57 The ECOWAS Framework
builds upon its predecessor, the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for
51 A. Essuman-Johnson, Regional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: A Comparative
Analysis of Two African Security Complexes, 3 AFR. J. POL. SCI. INT'L REL. 409, 412
(2009).
52 d
53 Southern African Customs Union Agreement art. 41, Oct. 21, 2002, WIPO Lex
No. TRT/SACU/001, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text
.jsp?fileid=229898.
54 GUSTAV BRINK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: LESSONS FROM
SOUTH AFRICA ICTSD DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 24 (2007).
55 Id
56 Econ. Cmty. of W. African States [ECOWAS], The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention
Framework, Reg. MSC/REG.1/01/08 (Jan. 16, 2008), available at
http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/framework/ECPFfinal.pdf
57 Id. at 7.
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Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security,58
and provides a set of guidelines for ECOWAS's other "conflict prevention
organs," including the Early Warning System, the Mediation and Security
Council, Offices of the Special Representative, and the Council of the Wise
and Special Mediators. 59 All of these "organs" could be classified under the
heading of ADR. Furthermore, the ECOWAS vision for their dispute
settlement system makes clear that "tensions between sovereignty and
supranationality, and between regime security and human security, shall be
progressively resolved in favour of supranationality and human security."60
As will be shown, this is exactly the sort of institutionalized dispute
settlement framework that African integration is largely missing.61
In 1993, the Organization of African Unity62 (OAU) (the forerunner of
the present-day African Union) formed a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management and Resolution, which was set up to anticipate and prevent
conflict in Africa. 63 Just as the OAU would be replaced with the African
Union,64 the Mechanism would ultimately be replaced by the African Union
5 8 ECOWAS, PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION,
MANAGEMENT, RESOLUTION, PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY (1999), available at
http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=ap101299&lang-en.
59 ECOWAS, supra note 58, at 6. Interestingly, many of these mechanisms have
also been instituted by the African Union. See ABou JENG, PEACEBUILDING IN THE
AFRICAN UNION 175 (2012).
60 ECOWAS, supra note 58, at 6.
61 ECOWAS emphasizes democratic principles in the way in which they implement
actions, which may have contributed to its relative success. Herbert Wulf & Tobias
Debiel, Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms: Tools for Enhancing the
Effectiveness of Regional Organisations? A Comparative Study of the AU, ECOWAS,
IGAD, ASEAN/ARF and PIF, at 17 (Crisis States Res. Ctr., Crisis States Working Papers
Series No. 2, Working Paper No. 49, 2009). ECOWAS' major downfall, however, has
been the "limited operational resources at its disposal." Id. This is worth noting as one
considers a future African Union initiative along similar lines to the ECOWAS project.
62 For a discussion of the evolution of African continental organizations, see
Mohammed Bedjaoui, Brief Historical Overview of Steps to African Unity, in THE
AFRICAN UNION: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: A MANUAL ON THE PAN-
AFRICAN ORGANIZATION 9 (Abdulqawi A. Yusuf & Fatsah Ouguergouz eds., 2012).
63 FRANs VILJOEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 289, 410 (2d ed.
2012).
6 Bedjaoui, supra note 62, at 20.
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Peace and Security Council (PSC). 65 The PSC consists of a number of
separate institutions, "some of [which] have not yet been made fully
functional." 66 The PSC is a self-contradictory body, requiring on the one
hand that "members [of the AU] must designate part of their military force to
be on 'standby' to join PSC peace missions," while at the same time adhering
strictly to the principles of "respect for territorial integrity, non-interference
in the domestic affairs of states, and respect for borders achieved at
independence." 67 Additionally, the AU created the African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM), which consists of a "voluntary process of submission
to review by 'peers' (fellow heads of state) of a country's record in political,
economic, and corporate governance." 68 This process is "aimed at a
'constructive dialogue' between equals, and derives from the self-imposed
commitment of states to take 'national ownership' of a rigorous process of
self-assessment." 69 While the APRM has been successful at "forestalling"
events in certain countries, it has not been able to effectively prevent those
events. 70
Two other forms of supranational quasi-judicial body that Africa has
adopted are the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), and
the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, which ostensibly
work closely together.71 Both of these bodies spring from the African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter), which was adopted in
1981 and entered into force in 1986. 72 The Commission's role is
"deliberately .. . minimalist" and is primarily aimed at monitoring AU
member states' human rights performance. 73 Unfortunately, the Commission
is severely underfunded, understaffed, and to put it succinctly "has clearly
been designed to accomplish very little." 74 The ACHPR was initially
intended to operate in tandem with a partner court, the stillborn African
65 Roland Adjovi, The Peace and Security Council, in THE AFRICAN UNION: LEGAL
AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: A MANUAL ON THE PAN-AFRICAN ORGANIZATION,
supra note 62, at 143.
66 VILJOEN, supra note 63, at 193.
67 Id. at 194-95 (citing to PSC Protocol, art. 2 (e), (f), (g), (i)).
68 VIJOEN, supra note 63, at 198.
69 Id. at 199.
70 Id. at 203-04.
71 Id. at 410-11.
72 Id. at 289, 411.
73 Id. at 289.
74 VILJOEN, supra note 63, at 293-94.
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Union Court of Justice.75 The Court of Justice was intended to resolve
"disputes about the common policies of the AU, and issues arising from
accelerated political and socioeconomic integration." 76 This body would later
be legislatively collapsed into the ACHPR-however the incorporation of its
jurisdiction has never actually taken place. 77
The AU dual-court system was originally envisaged along the European
Union's dual-court approach (a Court of Justice dealing with socio-economic
matters, and a Human Rights Court for violations of human rights),78 and
when drafting the Protocol for the [African Union's] Court of Justice, merger
was "considered but rejected." 79 In the absence of any debate, the AU
Assembly subsequently mandated the merger of the two institutions, based
ostensibly on a lack of funding for two separate Courts.80 The combined
Court was intended to have sweeping jurisdiction (or "competence") over:
[A]ll disputes that pertain to the interpretation and application of the AU
Constitutive Act, the interpretation and application or validity of all treaties
and legal instruments adopted and ratified under the auspices of the AU, 'all
acts, decisions, regulations and directives of the organs of the Union,' and
'the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation.' The Court has the power to make binding
decisions on member States. Failure to comply with the judgment of the
Court may attract sanctions from the AU Assembly. 81
This Court does not exist. In the six odd years from the adoption of the
Protocol to the writing of this paper, this contemplated judicial body with
sweeping jurisdiction has simply failed to materialize. What has ensued has
75 Id. at 205.
76 Id. (citing to African Union Constitutive Act, art 3, art 9(1)(a)).
77 ViuoEN, supra note 63, at 205.
7 8 JOHN FAIRHURST, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 151 (2010).
79 VILJOEN, supra note 63, at 448-49.
80 Id. at 449; see also Fatsah Ouguergouz, The African Court ofJustice and Human
Rights, in THE AFRICAN UNION: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: A MANUAL ON
THE PAN-AFRICAN ORGANIZATION, supra note 62, at 119, 120 ("The decision to merge
the two Courts was proposed by the bureau of the Assembly and was based 'on the need
to rationalize the two Courts and to make them efficient and cost effective."').
81 GIRMACHEw ALEMU ANEME, A STUDY OF THE AFRICAN UNION'S RIGHT OF
INTERVENTION AGAINST GENOCIDE, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR CRIMES 41
(2011) (citing to AFRICAN UNION, PROTOCOL ON THE STATUTE OF THE AFRICAN COURT OF
JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2008)).
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been a barrage of legislation amending this Protocol.82 Attempts to amend
and channel the Court's legislative basis have resulted in the Court itself not
being created at all. To date the only African Union Court in existence is the
ACHPR. Considering what is at stake here (and this paper will explain in
further detail exactly what is at stake here), this lack of action is not so much
an oversight as a travesty.
Regardless of its present nonexistence, however, there has also been
significant criticism simply of the proposed merger of the two courts. In the
words of one prominent author:
The merger of the two Courts is an illustration of the AU conflating the
legal-political and economic aspects of integration, and presents a possible
scenario in which states party to the AEC [African Economic Community]
would not be under the jurisdiction of a continental court. As individuals
only have standing to bring cases to the [merged] Court on human rights,
individuals would be excluded from accessing the Court in respect of
matters related to economic integration.83
Effectively, the AU deprived the continent of a potential judicial body
for the settlement of individual as well as national disputes, outside the rather
narrow context of human rights. At the time the African Commission itself
expressed its concern at the 'negative impact' that the decision could have on
the establishment of an effective African Court on Human and Peoples'
Rights, drawing attention to the different mandates and litigants of the two
courts. 84
Finally, even within its narrow context, the existing Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights suffers from significant criticisms.85 As of 2012, "only about
half of the AU member states have accepted the Court Protocol and only five
have agreed to allow direct individual access to the Court." 86
82 Frans Viljoen, AU Assembly Should Consider Human Rights Implications Before
Adopting the Amending Merged African Court Protocol, AFRICLAw (May 23, 2012),
http://africlaw.com/2012/05/23/au-assembly-should-consider-human-rights-implications-
before-adopting-the-amending-merged-african-court-protocol/#more-213.
83 VILJOEN, supra note 63, at 449; (emphasis added); see also Richard Frimpong
Oppong, The African Union, the African Economic Community and Africa's Regional
Economic Communities: Untangling a Complex Web, 18 AFRICAN J. INT'L COMP. L. 92,
100-03 (2010). For more on the African Economic Community, see infra Section IV.B.
84 ADEMOLA ABASS, PROTECTING HUMAN SECURITY IN AFRICA 289 (2010).
85 Id. at 290.
86 VILJOEN, supra note 63, at 456.
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Notwithstanding the unwillingness of member states to permit individual and
nongovernmental access to the Court,
The efficacy of the Court and the attainment of the objectives assigned to it
will ultimately depend not only on endogenous factors but also on
exogenous [factors] such as the provision by the African Union of sufficient
financial means enabling the Court to cope with its broad jurisdiction or the
readiness of African States to bring cases to the Court rather than to the
International Court of Justice for example.87
In short, while many commentators applaud the Court's existing human
rights mandate,88 in terms of the broader African picture, there are alarming
indications stemming from the collapse of the African Court of Justice into a
purely Human Rights Court, even if the jurisdiction of the Court includes
"constitutional issues relating to the African Union ... [and] jurisdiction to
deal with any issues of international law." 89 The reason for this is
predominantly that the new Court fails to incorporate the economic
integrationist aims of African transnationalism which lie at the very heart of
the African integrationist project, and which form the most basic goal of
transnational dispute resolution mechanisms in Africa, as will be discussed
below.
B. The Intended Goal and the Role ofDispute Resolution
Mechanisms in Africa
Since 1945 African intellectuals have urged:
[F]ratemal cooperation between African states [and the] creation of a united
Africa based on a federation of sub-regional groups ... There was a
consensus that regional cooperation and unity were crucial if the vast
resources of Africa were to be utilized for the prosperity of the continent
and its people. 90
87 Ouguergouz, supra note 80, at 141.
88 ABASS, supra note 84, at 311 ("[T]he Statute nevertheless constitutes a significant
advance towards enhancing the promotion and protection of human rights in Africa").
89 Ouguergouz, supra note 80, at 130-31.
90 P. Mweti Munya, The Organization of African Unity and its Role in Regional
Conflict Resolution an Dispute Settlement: A Critical Evaluation, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 537, 541 (1999).
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That consensus has not changed to this day. 91 Indeed, "[t]he need to
integrate African economies is widely accepted." 92 To this end the approach
taken has been "the division of the continent into regional integration areas
that would constitute a united African economy, the African Economic
Community [AEC]." 93 Thus a number of regional organizations were born:
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Arab Maghreb Union
(AMU) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). 94 These
groupings effectively encompass the entire continent.95 In addition to these
groups, some six other economic communities exist. 96
The key supranational body intended to be responsible for pursuing
continental integration, however, was the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), formed in 1963, which while "designed as a forum for cooperation,"
struggled with the reality that "the majority of African countries were not
remotely inclined to give up one iota of sovereignty to a continental
organization."97 Indeed, the OAU "failed to achieve much in advancing the
socio-economic development of the continent or in deepening the unity and
91 See, e.g., Richard Frimpong Oppong, Relational Issues of Law and Economic
Integration in Africa: Perspectives from Constitutional, Public and Private International
Law, 2 (Dec. 2009) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of British Columbia)
(citing UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA [UNECA], ASSESSING
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN AFRICA, ix (2004), available at
http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/33295/l/ubc_2010 spring oppongrichard _frimpong.pdf).
92 RICHARD FRIMPONG OPPONG, LEGAL ASPECTS OF EcoNoNIC INTEGRATION IN
AFRICA 7 (2011). See also, e.g., Richard S. Mukisa & Bankole Thompson, Prerequisites
of Economic Integration in Africa, 42 AFR. TODAY 56, 56 (1995); UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT [UNCTAD], ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
AFRICA REPORT 2009: STRENGTHENING REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION FOR
AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT 8 (2009) ("Since the independence era, virtually all African
countries have embraced regionalism. Today, there are more regional organizations in
Africa than in any other continent and most African countries are engaged in more than
one regional integration initiative.").
93 Trudi Hartzenberg, Regional Integration in Africa 5 (World Trade Org. Econ.
Research & Statistics Div., Working Paper, 2011).
94 Id.
95 Id. at 5.
96 UNCTAD, supra note 92, at 10.
97 Bedjaoui, supra note 62, at 17.
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integration of African peoples." 98 The OAU would ultimately be replaced in
2000 by the African Union. 99
The African Union's Constitutive Act rests on two pillars: "The first is
an aspiration which has .. . evolved into . .. the realisation of African unity
through a continental organization. The second pillar springs from the
realisation that existing organizations have shown their limitations."100 The
African Union was also accompanied by the creation of the New Economic
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), which aimed to specifically
improve socio-economic development in Africa, primarily through increased
economic integration. While on the one hand, NEPAD stated the intention of
leaders to "enforce the rule of law," the sole institutional instrument created
in order to enforce said rule of law was the African Peer Review Mechanism
which, as discussed above, has revealed its shortcomings, and more
importantly was originally conceived as a purely monitory body with no true
enforcement capability.' 0 '
Economic integration has been a key goal of the African cooperative
project. One author states that "[t]he imperative of unity on the African
continent is so obvious that any case for it would seem superfluous."' 02 It is a
given that a common market is a better vehicle for economic growth than
individual markets operating independently:
[T]he strength of a nation, and, afortiori [sic], a continent is usually
determined by its economy. Many African countries have stories of
economic woes to tell. It is in the light of this that the African Economic
Treaty is of paramount importance given the greater economic co-operation
among the countries of Europe and American states. 103
98 Tiyanjana Maluwa, The Transition from the OA U to the AU, in THE AFRICAN
UNION: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: A MANUAL ON THE PAN-AFRICAN
ORGANIZATION, supra note 62, at 25, 29-30.
99 Id. at 20.
100 Id.
101 Edward Kannyo, The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), in
THE AFRICAN UNION: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: A MANUAL ON THE PAN-
AFRICAN ORGANIZATION, supra note 62, at 203, 209.
102 AKIN OYEBODE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE
221 (2003).
103 ADEMOLA YAKUBU, HARMONISATION OF LAWS IN AFRICA 62-63 (1999)
(emphasis added). For more explanation of the justification for unity in Africa, see
OYEBODE, supra note 102.
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However, the pan-Africanist integration project is not confined to
economics, but includes a commitment to human rights enshrined in the
African Charter of Human Rights, as well as the African Union's
Constitutive Act which "provides extensively for human rights in its
Preamble, objectives, and founding principles." 104 Similarly, the AU's
partner organization, the New Economic Partnership for African
Development, makes reference to human rights in its Declaration.105 Despite
such bodies as the PSC, the APRM, and the Court on Human and Peoples'
Rights, both NEPAD and the AU have, with some exceptions, largely failed
to monitor and meaningfully impact human rights violations.106Furthermore,
on the economic front very little fundamental economic integration has
occurred.10 7 One report explains that "[fjor most of the regional integration
schemes, there was almost complete non-implementation of agreed
liberalization schedules as well as other obligations by members."108
One contributory aspect of this may be a vacuum of enforceability.' 09
Indeed, "the absence of legalism at community, regional and national levels
is an important problem for Africa's integration." 110 Likewise, where
regional bodies have created dispute resolution mechanisms, such as the
Organization for African Unity's (OAU's) various mechanisms, interference
in the internal affairs of member states is prohibited by the African
Charter. Ill With hindsight, "[t]he performance of the OAU in conflict
resolution can be characterized by modest success in a few cases and dismal
failure in most others."ll 2
In the absence of a supranational body reinforcing, affirming,
interpreting, and enforcing the treaties (including protocols, and "laws")
created by supranational bodies such as the AU and NEPAD, individual
104 VIUOEN, supra note 63, at 164.
105 Id. at 167.
106 Id. at 169. See also id. at 195-96 ("It is a cause for regret that the African
mechanism needed to be prodded into action on a matter of grave concern to the
continent"); id. at 198 (the AU Mission in Sudan has "to some extent contributed to
'further the cause of peace, security and stability' in Darfur") (emphasis added); id. at
296 ("the Commission has failed to deal effectively with complaints").
107 MIRosLAv N. JOvANOVIC, THE ECoNOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION
702-09 (2006).
108 UNCTAD, supra note 92, at 15.
109 See generally OPPONG, supra note 92.
I10 Id. at 115.
Ill Munya, supra note 90, at 578.
112 Id.
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nations have an incentive to preemptively breach the terms of the treaties in
the expectation that other countries will also breach the terms of the treaties.
There is little to no way out of an African Prisoner's Dilemma. In other
words, if all countries upheld the terms of their agreements, and actively
pursued integration, the continent would benefit as a whole; indeed,
individual countries would benefit. However, in the absence of any judicial
(or even quasi-judicial) body enforcing the terms of the agreements,
countries fear that when sticking to an agreement, other countries might not
do the same. This then creates incentives for all countries to avoid fulfilling
their obligations, and the result is the existing state of "complete non-
implementation of agreed liberalization schedules as well as other obligations
by members."ll 3 In other words, the absence of an overarching judicial (or
even quasi-judicial) body creates a "jurisdictional gap [that] will not aid the
uniform application and enforcement of community law within member
states ... [Furthermore, i]t is difficult to conceive of a stable and effective
economic community where community law is not uniformly applicable
within and enforceable against member states."11 4
In the absence of a guiding hand from the AU and NEPAD, regional
bodies have to some extent filled the void for forming transnational dispute
resolution mechanisms. A brief survey of such mechanisms reveals the
intentions and goals behind their formation. For instance, the East African
Customs Union (Dispute Settlement Understanding) Regulations describe
their dispute settlement mechanism's purpose as "to ensure uniformity
among Partner States in the implementation of the provisions on dispute
settlement and to ensure to the extent possible, that the process is
transparent, accountable, fair, predictable and consistent with the provisions
of the Protocol."" 5
The problem remains, however, that while regional bodies have to some
extent filled the void, "[p]ractically no African state's legal regime for the
transnationalization of civil justice is worthy of mention ... It is the
exception that African states participate in current international efforts to
produce a convention on the subject." 116 This unwillingness to
transnationalize justice is the real sticking point, and until African nations
113 UNCTAD, supra note 92, at 15.
114 OPPONG, supra note 92, at 176 (emphasis added).
115 E. African Cmty. Customs Union, Dispute Settlement Mechanism Regulations, at
Reg. 2, Annex XI (emphasis added).
116 Olusoji 0. Elias, Globalization, 'Law and Development,' and Contemporary
Africa, 2 EuR. J.L. REFORM 259, 271 (2000).
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recognize the benefits to such transnationalization, they will be permanently
held back from fulfilling their true potential, as explained in further detail
below.
C. Why should there be an African Dispute Resolution
Mechanism?
There is precedent for the use of ADR in African domestic and
traditional society, and today there are calls for increased ADR throughout
the continent.1 17 It is therefore natural for an African political or economic
organization, whose goal is continental integration, to adopt a system for
resolution of disputes that incorporates the basic elements of ADR.
Furthermore, models for such mechanisms have indeed already been created,
in the European Union, in African regional organizations, in trade settlement
mechanisms, and elsewhere.118
1. Legitimacy and Economics
There is an aspect of a legal system-a system of accountability-that
assumes "collective responsibility for past wrong."I 9 Under such a notion, a
society or community can hold members of its number accountable under the
legal system, and in this process the law itself becomes legitimized. 120
Indeed,
[a] community of principle, faithful to that promise, can claim the authority
of a genuine associative community and can therefore claim moral
legitimacy-that its collective decisions are matters of obligation and not
bare power-in the name of fratemity ... [A]ny other form of community,
whose officials rejected that commitment would from the outset forfeit any
claim to legitimacy under a fraternal ideal. 12 1
If the African economic and political experiment embodied in NEPAD
and the AU is to have any chance of success, they must engender a sense of
117 Uwazie, supra note 47, at 4-5.
118 See supra Part III for a brief description of existing mechanisms that are
designed to resolve international disputes, and which incorporate general ADR themes
into their procedures.
119 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 173 (1986).
120 See generally id. at 173-216.
121 Id. at 214.
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legitimacy amongst their member nations. The rhetoric espoused by
academics and politicians regarding the "African renaissance" 122 and a
community of African states is little more than a toothless hound in the
absence of legitimacy that can be derived on a number of levels; from
individuals within member nations, to the member nations themselves.123
A critical component required to derive this legitimacy is a system of
judicial arbitration or settlement of disputes.124 In the absence of any form of
judiciary or a means of settling disputes, the institutions themselves lack the
legitimacy they require.125 Indeed the process of legitimization through legal
resolution is circular-once started, the process leads to further commitment
to the principles of law, and thereafter other positive externalities may accrue.
Indeed,
A community of principle . .. provides a better defense of political
legitimacy than the other models . . .because [such a community of
principle] expresses a concern by each for all that is sufficiently special,
personal, pervasive, and egalitarian to ground communal obligation
according to standards for communal obligation we elsewhere accept. 126
In other words, by providing a means through which members of a
community are able to protect one another (i.e. a system of adjudication or
other form of dispute settlement) the community's obligations (in the form of
rules and institutions) gain a legitimacy they would otherwise lack. On a very
abstract level, this is precisely why the AU and NEPAD must pursue some
form of dispute resolution mechanism for its members.
122 See, for e.g., Kelvin Kachingwe, Reflections on the African Renaissance, DAILY
MAIL, http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/index.php/features/item/3879-reflections-on-the-
african-renaissance?tmpl=component&print-1 (last modified May 25, 2014).
123 MARTIN MEREDITH, THE STATE OF AFRICA 677-78 (2006).
124 OPPONG, supra note 92, at 100. See also Fabio Padovano, Grazia Sgarra & Nadia
Fiorino, Judicial Branch, Checks and Balances and Political Accountability, 14 CONST.
POL. EcoN. 47, 48 (2003) ("Provided it is independent, the judiciary improves the
accountability of democratic systems over and beyond the results obtained in political
economics models featuring the executive and the legislature only.").
125 See generally Padovano et al., supra note 124.
126 DwORKIN, supra note 119, at 216.
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This notion is hardly new. The ideas of "separation of powers" and
"checks and balances" have been espoused for centuries. 127 Some reference
to the so-called "Social Contract" is also relevant in defining this relationship
between legitimacy and the rule of law:
The social contract entails a consensual relationship between the state and
its institutions and government, and its peoples, in which the latter defer
some of their freedoms in return for resources and security provided by the
state. The rule of law is integral to this in supporting the rights of peoples,
the capacities of states, and the legitimacy of the social contract amongst
both. 128
A related aspect to this legitimacy argument is that enhanced legitimacy
can in fact lead to enhanced efficiency. For instance, "[i]t is widely
recognized that a system of universal and abstract rules, with institutions that
enforce them, and predictable mechanisms to regulate conflicts over both the
rules and their enforcement, has contributed to the economic success of the
Western nation-state."129 This logic was indeed explicitly recognized in the
earliest stages of the evolution of the European Union (EU), or more
specifically its forerunner, the European Economic Community (EEC).130 A
memo sent by the Commission of the EEC in October 1959 noted that
[a) true internal market between the six states will be achieved only if
adequate legal protection can be secured . .. As jurisdiction in both civil
and commercial matters is derived from the sovereignty of Member States,
and since the effect of judicial acts is confined to each national territory,
legal protection and, hence, legal certainty in the common market are
essentially dependent on the adoption by Member States of a satisfactory
127 See THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 235 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961);
CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 213 (D.
Carrithers ed., 1977).
128 Oliver P. Richmond, The Rule of Law in Liberal Peacebuilding, in
PEACEBUILDING AND RULE OF LAW IN AFRICA: JUST PEACE? 44, 44 (Chandra Lekha
Sriram et al. eds., 2011).
129 Douglas Alan Webb, Legal System Reform and Private Sector Development in
Developing Countries, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE
LAW: ISSUES OF PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE RULE OF
LAW IN A NEW ERA 45, 47 (Robert Pritchard ed., 1996) (emphasis added).
130 Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, COM (1979), 1979 0.J. (C 59/3).
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solution to the problems of the recognition and enforcement of
judgments.131
The EEC ultimately resolved this jurisdictional conundrum through the
European Court of Justice, which in the seminal cases of Van Gend en Loos
(1963)132 and Costa v. ENEL (1964)133 assumed jurisdiction over a large
number of matters, and has subsequently progressively expanded its
jurisdiction.134 Indeed this assumption of jurisdiction is commonly attributed
as a hugely significant reason for the EEC's (and subsequently the EU's)
success.135
Simple harmonization of existing regimes may be insufficient to achieve
the level of legal coherence required to create an efficient common market,
"especially if various national courts have to interpret[] rules of a Convention
the way they deem fit." 136 National courts are extremely unlikely to
proactively harmonize laws across borders, voluntarily sacrificing their
sovereignty, in the absence of any assurance that the courts of other countries
will do the same. 137 Indeed, "[m]ost developing countries view harmonisation
of laws as an infringement on their sovereignty."s38 Surpassing this negative
attitude is essential, and a supranational dispute settlement mechanism would
achieve this if Member nations agreed to be bound by its rulings.
Thus, a system of institutions which enforces economic rules is a critical
component of economic success, particularly when looking to integrate and
harmonize different countries. Such a system is practically nonexistent on the
African continent. Referring to this as the "African problem," one author
suggests that
Developed societies have the capacity to create, grasp, and rely on a belief
system of abstract ideals ... In developing societies, the subjective,
personal element, where loyalties are given not to abstract concepts but to
131 Id.
132 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen,
1963 E.C.R. 1.
133 Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. Ente Nazionale per l'Energia Elettrica, 1964 E.C.R.
584.
134 See generally Antoine Vauchez, The Transnational Politics of Judicialization:
Van Genden Loos and the Making ofEU Polity, 16 EUR. L.J. 1 (2010).
135 Id. at 1-2.
136 YAKUBU,supra note 103, at 38.
137 9.
138 Id. at 39.
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families, patrons, rulers, ethnic or religious identities or leaders, tends to be
more prevalent. 139
In this view, a rule of law that relies on "abstract ideals" is better able to
create amenable conditions for trade, commerce, and the efficient functioning
of the markets. Where, as in Africa, this reliance is lacking, there is less
likelihood of efficiency being maximised.
In short, the argument for institutionalized enforceability is supported by
legal legitimacy, political realism, and economic incentive. However, there
are further reasons for creating an institution of enforceability, and
specifically a mechanism that incorporates elements of ADR.
2. The Criminal Justice Argument
Africa has been riven by atrocities perpetrated by governments
throughout its colonial and post-colonial history.140 Indeed, this is borne out
by the number of times that representatives of African nations have been
indicted by the ICC.141 This disproportionate indictment schedule which has
focused on Africa has resulted in a sense of victimization by African
governments, if not their peoples. 142 This in turn has resulted in a loss of
legitimacy for the ICC, the net result being that while African people may
support the ICC, their governments have lost interest in supporting the ICC-
this is represented by their refusal to arrest and deport indicted individuals, as
139 Elias, supra note 116, at 266 (quoting RUMU SARKAR, DEVELOPMENT LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 7-8 (1999)).
140 See generally MEREDITH, supra note 123.
141 Lydia Apori Nkansah, International Criminal Justice in Africa: Some Emerging
Dynamics, 4 J. POL. & L. 74, 76 (2011) ("The ICC's indictments up to date are only in
connection with alleged offences committed by Africans against Africans regarding
conflict situations in Uganda, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central
African Republic (CAR) . . . The ICC is currently undertaking investigations into the
conflict situation in the Republic of Kenya. . . and the Security Council has requested the
ICC to investigate Libya for human rights abuses in the ongoing political upheavals in
Libya.").
142 Mary Kimani, Pursuit of Justice or Western Plot?, AFRICA RENEWAL, Oct. 15,
2009, at 12, available at http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/october-
2009/pursuit-justice-or-western-plot (77% of Kenyans and 71% of Nigerians approved of
the controversial ICC indictment of Omar al-Bashir. In Egypt, an Arab state where one
might expect support for al-Bashir, only 52% of those polled disapproved of the
indictment.).
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required by the Rome Statute1 43 (to which many, if not all, are signatories).144
This loss of legitimacy has been heightened by the refusal or inability of the
ICC to take action against those states that do refuse to cooperate with the
ICC by not handing over indicted individuals. Thus, the lofty ideals of the
ICC are wasted as their legitimacy flounders in the African continent, where
perhaps more than elsewhere, their goals and aims are exceedingly important
in curbing the actions and activities of governments who violently repress
their peoples.145 A large part of the problem facing the ICC has been their
refusal to consider the political ramifications of their actions. 146 For instance,
in indicting the President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, the ICC threatened to
and did in fact derail an ongoing negotiation process that sought to bring an
end to the violence in Sudan.147
Furthermore, notwithstanding the criticisms of the ICC's approach at a
simply practical level, there are deeper underlying concerns regarding the role
of retributive justice in conflict settings. As one African academic explains:
[I]ntemational criminal justice is meshed in politics ... [R]etributive justice
could possibly quell impunity .. . but, it can neither end an ongoing conflict
nor be an avenue for national reconciliation ... [T]he internationalization of
justice alienates both the adjudicators and the adjudicating society from the
process, thereby denying the process ... the impetus that it would require
for it to benefit the end users or victims of war.14 8
143 G6ran Sluiter, Cooperation of States with International Criminal Tribunals, in
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRII4NAL JUSTICE 187, 192-97 (Antonio
Cassese ed., 2009) ("The . . . legal basis for the duty to cooperate is the Treaty of
Rome.").
144 The International Criminal Court: Why Africa Still Needs It, ECONOMIST, Jun. 3,
2010, at 53, available at http://www.economist.com/node/16274301 (stating that thirty of
Africa's 53 countries have signed up to the ICC, and African nations were instrumental in
setting up the ICC); Gysbert Engelbrecht, The ICC's Role in Africa, 12 AFR. SEC. REv. 61
(2003), available at http://www.issafrica.org /pubs/ASR/12No3/El.html (stating that at
the time of the ICC's inception three of the 18 judges were Africans, and as of 2013 the
current Chief Prosecutor is a Gambian, Fatou Bensouda).
145 See Adolfo Ceretti, Collective Violence and International Crimes, in THE
OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 143, at 5.
146 JACQUELINE GEIS & ALEX MUNDT, WHEN TO INDICT? THE IMPACT OF TIMING OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL INDICTMENTS ON PEACE PROCESSES AND HUMANITARIAN
ACTION (2009) (paper prepared for World Humanitarian Studies Conference).
147 a u 1
148 Nkansah, supra note 14 1, at 8 1.
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Thus, in the realm of supranational criminal justice, African nations have
an opportunity to set up a system that is amenable to their particular needs,
namely a dispute resolution mechanism that is willing to take into account the
political ramifications of its actions, and which actively seeks to incorporate
elements of negotiation and mediation into its processes.
The justifications for creation of the ICC have not changed.149 In any
ordinary society when disputes are settled by "fair, impartial, and equitable
legal systems, individuals and groups are less likely to resort to self-help and
violence to achieve their personal and collective security and well-being." 150
Derivatively,
It is very difficult to imagine any peace project surviving without the
institutions necessary to cement relations between its participants, to
provide a future prospect of a long-standing peace, which both defines the
rights and limits of the system for its subject and carries with it an aspect of
punitive enforcement capacity.151
However, as is apparent from its hopeless inadequacy to ensure
signatories' cooperation, the ICC is no longer an instrument capable of
fulfilling its goals.152 Thus, there is a rule-of-law vacuum that an African
supranational dispute resolution mechanism could seek to fill, in a proactive
way, and thereby perhaps generate the same levels of excitement that
abounded in Africa around the time of the Rome Statute's signing.153 An
ADR-based mechanism would be extremely suitable for achieving this.
The crimes that fall under the ICC's ambit, including genocide and
torture, are such that result in "victims ... feelfing that] they no longer
belong to the political community: they no longer belong to a state, or a
149 See Jeremy Rabkin, Global Criminal Justice: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed,
38 CORNELL INT'L L.J.753, 755 (2005) ("People who suffer the most terrible oppression
hope that effective force will come to their rescue.").
150 Brian A. Kritz, The Rule of Law and Peacebuilding, in INTEGRATED
PEACEBUILDING: INNOVATING APPROACHES To TRANSFORMING CONFLICT 275, 281
(Craig Zelizer ed., 2013).
151 Richmond, supra note 128, at 50-51.
152 Tanzil-Zaman Chowdhury, Selective Justice: The ICC and Africa, AFRICAN
OUTLOOK, http://www.africanoutlookonline.com/index.php?option=comcontent&
view-article&id=2650:selective-justice-the-icc-and-africa&catid= 114:letters-to-the-
editor&Itemid=617 (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
153 The International Criminal Court: Why Africa Still Needs It, supra note 144, at
53.
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territory, or a family."' 54 There is a need to involve communities affected by
human rights violations in a process of not simply retribution, but
reconciliation.155 This involvement should not be "a form of disguised formal
justice" but should allow "community members to engage in the settlement of
problems which have shaken societal foundations."' 56 This could involve
mediation or truth and reconciliation commissions. 157 Indeed, mediation
could play a significant role in resolving disputes in post-conflict societies.158
These sorts of approaches are called for in the field of criminal justice,
particularly in the African continent.1 59
Rather than pursuing an impersonal, litigation-based approach to justice,
ADR techniques feasibly offer superior alternatives, which would recognize
the role of the victim in a positive, meaningful way, such that their
incorporation into the community would also be considered a goal of the
dispute resolution process.160 As Jose Alvarez notes,
Awareness of the alternatives to international criminal justice and the
rationales offered to justify them cast a critical light on the assumptions of
some that the ideal forum for mass atrocity is an international court, or that
there is only a dichotomous choice between criminal accountability and
total amnesia, or that only criminal punishment (i) can produce some
positive effects (in particular, can produce deterrence, comfort victims,
rehabilitate or help 'transition' societies into liberalism, affirm the national
and international law), (ii) comports with popular (and therefore
'democratic') desires, or (iii) is compatible with both international
humanitarian and human rights obligations.161
154 Adolfo Ceretti, Collective Violence and International Crimes, in THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 143, at 11.
155 Pacifique Manirakiza, Customary African Approaches to the Development of
International Criminal Law, in AFRICA: MAPPING NEW BOUNDARIES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 35, 60-63 (Jeremy I. Levitt ed., 2008).
156 Id. at 63.
157 JENNIFER L. DE MAIO, CONFRONTING ETHNIC CONFLICT: THE ROLE OF THIRD
PARTIES IN MANAGING AFRICA'S CIVIL WARS 54-56 (2009); Manirakiza, supra note 155,
at 62-63.
158 DE MAIO, supra note 157, at 54-56.
159 See generally Manirakiza, supra note 155.
160 Marshall, supra note 13, at 66-67.
161 Jose E. Alvarez, Alternatives to International Criminal Justice, in THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 143, at 26, 37.
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Rather than handing over the reins of their accountability to an
international body that fails to fully recognize the realities of Africa's
political environment, if African nations were to pursue the creation of their
own dispute settlement mechanism, they might actually accomplish the goal
of achieving criminal justice on some level, while simultaneously creating an
atmosphere in which peace and the wellbeing of the victims are
accommodated goals. One might even go so far as to suggest that in the wake
of the ICC's collapse of legitimacy, African states are in fact under an
obligation to create such a dispute settlement body.
3. The Failure ofExisting Mechanisms
As suggested throughout this paper, there is currently no African Union
body responsible for harmonizing economic law. Furthermore, there is no
effective African Union criminal or human rights body that incorporates ADR
processes into its mechanisms. This final argument thus suggests that not only
is there a necessity for a comprehensive African dispute settlement body
(such as the originally-envisioned African Court of Justice), but that a new
structural mechanism should incorporate ADR themes into its processes,
since there would appear to be a logical symbiosis between the aims and roles
of such a transnational organization, and the aims and roles played by ADR.
Insofar as the incorporation of ADR processes is concerned, if one
accepts the premise that the AU and NEPAD are seeking to form a
"community" of African nations, but simultaneously legitimize their
existence, it seems that a structural ADR mechanism is the most logical
approach to take, since ADR's focus can be on entrenching community
relations and is based on the aforementioned philosophy of "co-operative
problem-solving." 162 Indeed, ADR's recent rise to prominence in the
domestic realm has been fueled in part by a "concern with peaceful resolution
of disputes from community to global contexts ... [and] a renewed emphasis
on a search for community living and a community justice to match it."1 63
This emphasis on community is fundamental to the very notion and attraction
of ADR as opposed to litigation.164
As described above, the envisioned African Union Court of Justice
collapsed into the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, which itself
suffers from severe setbacks, including an unwillingness by member nations
162 Marshall, supra note 13, at 67.
163 Mackie, supra note 9, at 2.
164 Marshall, supra note 13, at 67.
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to grant direct access to individuals and nongovernmental organizations as
well as an apparent general lack of enthusiasm for the new Court in its
entirety. 165 Most importantly, the only existing medium for resolution of
transnational disputes is the ACHPR, a Court which follows adjudicative,
Court-based principles fairly closely.166 There is no real possibility for the
Court to propose or involve itself in any ADR-based processes in order to end
a given dispute.
This problem may itself be a large reason for another challenge facing the
Court: the present lack of support for the project (as noted above, as of 2012
only half of the African Union's members have signed onto the new merged
Court).167 As one author puts it so clearly, one "reason why states may be
apprehensive about accepting the competence of the African Human Rights
Court is an alleged 'African preference' for non-judicial methods of resolving
disputes, in which dialogue and conciliation are emphasized." 68
Indeed, this argument has some weight to it, but there remains a
counterargument which suggests that such an analysis fails to fully capture
the "reality of present-day African society . . . [where] factors such as
increasing urbanization, acculturation, and population concentration have
contributed to the disintegration of traditional authority." 169 This
counterargument makes the point that the modem African society does in fact
require a strict rule-of-law litigation-based regime for the settlement of
disputes. Although "the rule of law may be at odds with more communal
conceptions of law and social order in some societies . . . [t]his is not
necessarily always negative." 70
In truth, neither analysis is sufficient on its own. In the first place,
traditional authority does continue to exist and is used extensively in rural
Africa. 171 However, that is simply not always a good thing--often that
traditional form of dispute resolution can yield outcomes that are inherently
unfair or undesirable, in which case there is indeed a need for a stronger rule-
165 VIJOEN, supra note 63, at 456; Ouguergouz, supra note 80, at 141.
166 See generally Ouguergouz, supra note 80; ABASS, supra note 84, at 289.
167 VILJOEN, supra note 63, at 456.
16 8 Id. at 458-59.
169 Id. at 459.
170 Richmond, supra note 128, at 53.
171 Laura Nader & Elisabetta Grande, Current Illusions and Delusions about
Conflict Management-in Africa and Elsewhere, 27 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 573, 578-79
(2002).
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of-law based Court system to play a part.172 The fact is that ADR processes
have long played a part in African dispute settlement, that there is a tradition
that exists outside of the Western litigation mindset of pursuing reconciliation
over adjudication. Indeed, it could well be argued that were it not for the
advent of colonization and the influx of Western legal norms and cultures,
ADR processes would remain today the primary dispute resolution systems in
Africa.173
Furthermore, and this is perhaps most important, the functions played by
ADR processes are directly consistent with-and can be extremely helpful in
facilitating-both the economic integrationist project, which forms the
mainstay of the African Union's manifesto, and the provision of criminal
justice to African politics, without doing so blindly and carelessly; an
approach that has been distinctly lacking.174 There is a role to be played for
ADR processes.
This all being said, however, the counterargument makes a very valid
point, in that ADR processes should not be exclusive. There must be a
fallback mechanism which consists of litigation-style adjudication in the
traditional (Western) sense which can provide resolution if ADR processes do
fail. The two approaches need not be in opposition to one another, just as
these two arguments need not argue against one another so much as for the
same point, namely the creation of a dispute resolution mechanism that
incorporates ADR themes into its processes, while maintaining a traditional
adjudicatory body as a fallback.
In conclusion, when factoring both of these contradictory analyses into
account, one comes to the inescapable conclusion that some form of
institutionalized mechanism should exist, but that such a mechanism should
not be exclusively adjudicatory and should be prepared to consider alternative
methods and means of dispute resolution without closing itself off to the
(legal and practical) capabilities of adjudicative resolution. Thus, a structural
ADR mechanism would effectively kill two birds with one stone. On the one
hand, a form of enforcement mechanism--or, to phrase it differently, a
system for resolving disputes between member nations-would engender the
legitimacy of the integrative project. At the same time, and on the other hand,
a dispute resolution mechanism that takes a more ADR-focused approach
would be more in line with traditional African methods of dispute resolution
and could be more conducive to fostering a community-spirit amongst
172 Richmond, supra note 128, at 53.
173 Id.
174 See, e.g., Richmond, supra note 128, at 53-54.
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African nations than a litigious, adjudication-based mechanism or (the worst
option) the absence of any dispute settlement mechanism at all.
V. IMPLEMENTING AN AFRICAN DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM
Having described in some detail the problem facing the African
integrationist project as well as an abstract proposed solution (namely the
creation of an African dispute settlement mechanism that incorporates ADR
practices), it remains necessary to provide the broad brushstrokes of what
such a mechanism would entail. Obviously a precise blueprint for such a
mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper; however, there are certain
basic elements of such a future mechanism that can be recognized. This
section will describe those broad brushstrokes as well as illuminate the
opportunity to create this mechanism that is rapidly arising in the form of a
new African economic treaty.
A. Abstract Implementation
The most important test that this new mechanism must pass is the test of
whether or not African nations will buy into it. In order to be an effective
arbiter of disputes, it is critical that African nations buy into and support the
project. Indeed, in all respects, cooperation between African governments is
imperative, including broad adherence to a collective set of policies designed
to address "impunity on the shores of Africa."1 75
To this end, two elements are particularly important. First, in order to
actually effectuate the aim of legitimizing the African integration
experiment, such a judicial body must be genuine in its role as arbiter of
disputes. As such, "[t]he most important criterion is independent selection
and tenure" of adjudicators. 176 In order to garner the support amongst
African nations that it needs, the independence of the adjudicators is critical.
A second significant concern vital to the effective and legitimate operation of
such a mechanism is the role of legal discretion in facilitating higher goals
than simply justice at any price.177 In this respect and in particular when
considering the role that ADR can play in resolving disputes, "[a] judge who
accepts integrity will think that the law it defines sets out genuine rights
litigants have ... [b]ut though this requirement honors . . . procedural due
364
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process ... other and more powerful aspects of political morality might
outweigh this requirement."1 78 In other words, judges must be careful to
consider the political ramifications of their actions. Much as the European
Court of Justice has done, they must be mindful of what the integrationist
project entails, as well as the fact that the very existence of their institution is
to some extent the most legitimizing factor in that project. Judicial discretion
will be critical in determining the success or failure of the project.
Two further elements that are critical to the success of the mechanism
include the legislative and judicial incorporation of ADR themes into the
adjudicative processes, in order to present the parties with the best possible
form of dispute resolution given the context and details of their particular
dispute; and (second) at the same time maintaining some form of
adjudication as a fallback measure. As this paper has consistently stated, the
presence of ADR methods in the dispute resolution process could be
instrumental in creating a package that is desirable to member states, as well
as providing an efficient, satisfactory method for resolution of disputes.
Scholars in the arena of international criminal justice have noted that the
"package, design and implementation of mechanisms for international justice
should take into consideration the people who are going to experience the
processes and live with the effects of the mechanisms." 79 In Africa this is
particularly resonant considering the failures of the ICC.
Finally, the mechanism must be endowed with sufficient financial and
human resources for it to operate "promptly and effectively." 180 Where
previous mechanisms have all been under-financed (which indeed is
reportedly responsible for the merger of the African Court of Justice and the
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights) the new mechanism must be
adequately supported financially. While many African countries struggle
with their own economies, financial contributions to the mechanism must be
considered an investment that will reap significant benefits in the medium to
long term. Once Court decisions actually effectuate the integrationist project,
and create the opportunity for positive economic conditions throughout the
continent, the Court will effectively pay for itself. In this regard, the regional
hegemons such as South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria, who have the most to
178 DWORKIN, supra note 119, at 218-19. Additionally, as a model for the African
experiment, it is interesting to note that EU Courts are not governed by precedent-
discretion is indeed critical to their efficient (and legitimate) operation.
179 Nkansah, supra note 141, at 81.
180 Keohane et al., supra note 1, at 462.
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gain from increased economic integration, should take it upon themselves to
spearhead the financing of the mechanism.
As one prominent author notes, the "success of any institution requires
the existence of faith in its work, progressive ambition in its focus, and the
appropriate moral and financial support from the states that constitute it."181
These are the basic elements required for the long-term success of the
African integrationist project, and in particular the success of any African
dispute resolution mechanism.
B. Practical Implementation
Due to the history of Africa, tainted as it is by interstate as well as
intrastate warfare, poverty, exploitation of and by so-called "allies", and a
host of other associated reasons, there is a deep mistrust amongst African
nations (and more importantly, their leaders), which is a clear obstacle to the
creation of an effective dispute resolution mechanism. 182 Furthermore, and
perhaps even more significantly, other problems include a general lack of
respect for the rule of law, which has been engendered across the continent:
While of course clientelism and patronage are not unique to Africa, the type
of intensive neo-patrimonialism . . . that we can observe across large
swathes of the continent is indeed noteworthy. Competition over access to
justice, disputes over relevant law, and disagreements over relevant legal
authority may reinforce existing social divides, but also have historically
created a situation where . . . bypassing the law is "accepted as normal
behaviour, condemned only in so far as it benefits someone rather than
oneself." At the same time, there are many fragile states .. .which may not
fully control all national territories, or be capable of extending the justice
sector and relevant institutions across countries. In such countries, people
may choose to, or be compelled to, turn to non-state justice providers. These
dynamics pose critical challenges to the promotion of rule of law on the
continent. 183
181 JENG, supra note 59, at 289.
182 MEREDITH, supra note 123, at 680-88; Munya, supra note 90, at 537-39. See
also YAKUBU, supra note 103, at 39 ("It must also be pointed out that unnecessary
suspicion among developing countries hampers harmonization.").
183 Chandra Lekha Sriram, Olga Martin-Ortega & Johanna Herman, Promoting the
Rule of Law: From Liberal to Institutional Peacebuilding, in PEACEBUILDING AND RULE
OF LAW IN AFRICA: JUST PEACE?, supra note 128, at 1, 2 (citing to CHRISTOPHER
CLAPHAM, THIRD WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION 49 (1985)).
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Indeed, these are all arguments in favor of the creation of such a
mechanism, for it would solve at least some if not many of the problems that
presently plague the continent:
Economic co-operation enhances the inter-play of legal collaboration and
mutual respect between nations that would otherwise suffer from mutual
economic suspicion and war. This is more important in Africa where a little
spark could cause a great conflagration due to mutual suspicion among the
nations ... There is nothing as suitable as having a single court for the
resolution of matters which may be of common interest.. . Since legal
cooperation brings nations together, this would enhance the spirit of
brotherliness among member states. 184
Before becoming a solution to the problem, however, it is of course necessary
to get past the problem itself (a troubling paradox indeed).
Hope is not completely lost, however, for a new integrative experiment is
being planned-a free trade zone that will encompass almost the entirety of
the continent. 185 This model will follow in the wake of the African Economic
Community and will form a significant step in the African integrative
experiment. Personal discussions by the author with senior staff members in
the South African Permanent Mission to the World Trade Organization
suggest that negotiations for this new free trade agreement are ongoing, and it
is (in this author's opinion, rather optimistically) hoped that by 2020 such a
structure should be concluded.
However, this modern framework may fail to live up to expectations in
the absence of a "community of principle" backed up by adherence to law.
There is a need to create a mechanism that will enable states to resolve their
differences, a mechanism that is backed up by the power of the community,
which legitimizes the community and enforces the law, while at the same
time doing so in recognition of the politics surrounding the dispute. Such a
mechanism, relying on ADR models as followed in other international
tribunals and mechanisms, may enable the African integrative experiment to
finally gain traction.
Indeed, considering the failure of the past models to fundamentally
integrate, the new experimental model may present the perfect new
framework in which to house such a mechanism. Now is the hour for African
thinkers and politicians to legitimize their goals and institutional frameworks
184 YAKUBu, supra note 103, at 64-65 (emphasis added).
185 JAMES THUO GATHII, AFRICAN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AS LEGAL
REGIMES 386-88 (2011).
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through the creation of an effective, efficient, and recognized dispute
resolution mechanism.
Within the framework of a new African economic partnership in its
attempt to follow the European experiment to its present-day reality of peace
and relative political unity, there is an opportunity to create the kind of
institution that to-date has been lacking within the African arena. Indeed, one
might even argue that not only is the opportunity present, but also that the
entire experiment will fail as completely as its predecessors in uniting African
nations if it does not accommodate and provide for some form of active
dispute resolution mechanism with both a judicial and ADR role.
It is important, furthermore, not to be tempted into broadening the ambit
of the present Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. The present Court serves
a critical function in serving the continent's human rights needs. Indeed, with
the creation of a new judicial body there is potential to further limit the
jurisdiction of the present Court to purely human rights matters, thereby "un-
complicating" the jurisdictional confusion that might arise. The fear is of
course that an increased mandate would throw off-balance the existing
mandate, thereby threatening the critical role that the present court plays in
the field of human rights. It is thus vital that the new mechanism be distinct
from the present Court. Much like the European Court of Justice and the
European Court of Human Rights, the two bodies could work closely
together, and of course their roles would need to be clarified by legislation
upon the creation of the second body. However, it is important to maintain
that separation.
VI. CONCLUSION
If one accepts the premise that economic integration is a good thing, then
an enforcement mechanism is necessary. If one accepts the premise that
accountability for heinous acts perpetrated by individual state and non-state
actors is a good thing, then an enforcement mechanism is necessary. If one
accepts the premise that the existing mechanisms were created for a reason,
then surely an enforcement mechanism is a good thing. Furthermore, if the
existing mechanisms are inadequate to do the job, then what role and
structure should such a mechanism take?
In the African context, a strictly juridical "rule of law" litigation based
system may not be the answer. This is demonstrated by the failings of the ICC
in that African governments (a) feel victimized by the ICC's focus on Africa,
(b) consider the ICC to be a danger to peace efforts, and (c) have failed to
cooperate with the ICC as required under the Rome Statute. These failings,
especially when taking into account Africa's history of informal ADR
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methods of dispute resolution as used by traditional societies, indicate that an
African supranational enforcement mechanism, particularly in the criminal
justice context, but also in other areas of expertise (including resolution of
trade and commercial disputes), should incorporate ADR processes into its
running.
The ECOWAS and EU experiences seem to support this notion and,
furthermore, provide models for how such a mechanism could look. Indeed,
the African Union originally intended for an African Court of Justice to exist.
It is always difficult to draw inferences from the absence of an institutional
body, but in the present case it seems plausible to rely on the EU experience
(where the European Court of Justice has been instrumental in inciting
integration) and the intuitive and much-lauded Montesquieuan notion of
checks and balances, under which a judiciary is a fundamental component of
a legitimate governing body.
Finally, as noted in Section V above, it is beyond the ambit of this paper
to outline and describe what such a mechanism would look like in any great
detail. Suffice it to say that this paper has drawn an abstract picture of why
such a mechanism should exist. It would be encouraging to see future
academic research that seeks to formulate more specific notions of how such
a mechanism should look and function. Indeed, while many academics are
quick to judge the failings of existing mechanisms, in this field there is scope
for academic contributions to formulate and craft such a future mechanism,
thereby contributing to the creation of a solution, rather than outlining the
problems themselves (unlike this very article). However, while there is much
scope for academic contribution in this matter, the true impetus for the model
called for in this paper must come from African governments themselves.
While scholars can (and indeed must) assist in designing the intellectual
framework of such a mechanism from the relative comfort of academia, at the
end of the day it is the politicians that will truly shape such a mechanism.
Until such a time as African nations recognize this deficit in their
supranational framework, true integration will be lacking, and the immense
good that could be achieved from an institutionalized system of enforcement
will be notable only by its absence. With a future African free trade area
envisioned, now is the time for African leaders and governments to take the
destinies of their countries into their own hands, and realize Africa's true
potential. Now is the hour to change history-now is the time for the leopard
to change its spots.
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